Abstract. Four round Feistel permutation (like DES) is super-pseudorandom if each round function is random or a secret universal hash function. A similar result is known for five round MISTY type permutation. It seems that each round function must be at least either random or secret in both cases. In this paper, however, we show that the second round permutation g in five round MISTY type permutation need not be cryptographic at all, i.e., no randomness nor secrecy is required. g has only to satisfy that g(x) ⊕ x = g(x ) ⊕ x for any x = x . This is the first example such that a non-cryptographic primitive is substituted to construct the minimum round super-pseudorandom permutation. Further we show efficient constructions of super-pseudorandom permutations by using above mentioned g.
Introduction

Super-pseudorandomness
A secure block cipher should be indistinguishable from a truly random permutation. Consider an infinitely powerful distinguisher D which tries to distinguish a block cipher from a truly random permutation. It outputs 0 or 1 after making at most m queries to the given encryption and/or decryption oracles. We say that a distinguisher D is a pseudorandom distinguisher if it has oracle access to the encryption oracle. We also say that a distinguisher D is a super-pseudorandom distinguisher if it has oracle access to both the encryption oracle and the decryption oracle. Then a block cipher E is called pseudorandom if any pseudorandom distinguisher D cannot distinguish E from a truly random permutation. A block cipher E is called super-pseudorandom if any super-pseudorandom distinguisher D cannot distinguish E from a truly random permutation.
Previous works
The super-pseudorandomness of Feistel permutation (like DES) has been studied extensively so far. Let φ(f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) denote the three round Feistel permutation such that the i-th round function is f i . Similarly, let φ(f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 ) denote the four round Feistel permutation.
Suppose that each f i is a random function. Then Luby and Rackoff proved that φ(f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) is pseudorandom and φ(f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 ) is super-pseudorandom [4] . Lucks showed that the φ(h 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) is pseudorandom even if h 1 is an -XOR universal hash function [5] . Suppose that h 1 and h 4 are uniform -XOR universal hash functions. Then Naor and Reingold proved that h 4 • φ(f 2 , f 3 ) • h 1 is super-pseudorandom [8] , and Ramzan and Reyzin showed that φ(h 1 , f 2 , f 3 , h 4 ) is super-pseudorandom even if the distinguisher has oracle access to f 2 and f 3 [9] .
On the other hand, let ψ(p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 ) denote the five round MISTY type permutation such that the i-th round permutation is p i . Suppose that each p i is a random permutation. Then Iwata et al. [3] and Gilbert and Minier [2] independently showed that ψ(p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 ) is super-pseudorandom. More than that, let h i be a uniform -XOR universal permutation. Iwata et al. proved that 
Our contribution
Four round Feistel permutation (like DES) is super-pseudorandom if each round function is random or a secret universal hash function. A similar result is known for five round MISTY type permutation. It seems that each round function must be at least either random or secret in both cases.
In this paper, however, we show that the second round permutation g in five round MISTY type permutation need not be cryptographic at all, i.e., no randomness nor secrecy is required. g has only to satisfy that g(x) ⊕ x = g(x ) ⊕ x for any x = x . This is the first example such that a non-cryptographic primitive is substituted to construct the minimum round super-pseudorandom permutation. Further we show efficient constructions of super-pseudorandom permutations by using above mentioned g.
One might wonder if five rounds can be reduced to four rounds to obtain super-pseudorandomness of MISTY. However, it is not true because Sakurai and Zheng showed that the four round MISTY type permutation ψ(p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 ) is not super-pseudorandom [10] .
More precisely, we prove that five round MISTY is super-pseudorandom if it is ψ(h 1 , g, p, p
, where g is the above mentioned permutation, h 1 is an -XOR universal permutation, h 5 is a uniform -XOR universal permutation, and p is a random permutation. Further, suppose that both h 1 and h 5 are uniform -XOR universal permutations. Then we prove that it is super-pseudorandom even if the distinguisher has oracle access to p and p −1 . More than that, we study the case such that the third and the fourth round permutations are both p. In this case, we show that it is not super-pseudorandom nor pseudorandom if a distinguisher has oracle access to p. More formally, we show that for any fixed and public g, ψ(p 1 , g, p, p, p 5 ) is not pseudorandom if a distinguisher has oracle access to p.
Preliminaries
Notation
For a bit string x ∈ {0, 1} 2n , we denote the first (left) n bits of x by x L and the last (right) n bits of x by x R . If S is a probability space, then s R ← S denotes the process of picking an element from S according to the underlying probability distribution. The underlying distribution is assumed to be uniform (unless otherwise specified).
Denote by F n the set of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n , which consists of 2 n·2 n functions in total. Similarly, denote by P n the set of all permutations from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n , which consists of (2 n )! permutations in total.
2.2 MISTY type permutation [6, 7] Definition 2.1 (The basic MISTY type permutation). Let x ∈ {0, 1} 2n . For any permutation p ∈ P n , define the basic MISTY type permutation ψ p ∈ P 2n
Definition 2.2 (The r round MISTY type permutation, ψ). Let r ≥ 1 be an integer, p 1 , . . . , p r ∈ P n be permutations. Define the r round MISTY type permutation ψ(p 1 , . . . , p r ) ∈ P 2n as ψ(p 1 , . . . , p r )
2n .
See Fig. 1 (the five round MISTY type permutation) for an illustration. Note that p i in Fig. 1 is a permutation. For simplicity, the left and right swaps are omitted.
Uniform -XOR universal permutation
Our definitions follow from those given in [1, 3, 9, 11] . 1. H n is a uniform permutation family if for any element x ∈ {0, 1} n and any element y ∈ {0, 1} n , there exist exactly
H n is an -XOR universal permutation family if for any two distinct elements x, x ∈ {0, 1} n and any element y ∈ {0, 1} n , there exist at most #H n permutations h ∈ H n such that h(x) ⊕ h(x ) = y.
We will use the phrase "h is an -XOR universal permutation" to mean that "h is drawn uniformly from an -XOR universal permutation family". Similarly, we will use the phrase "h is a uniform -XOR universal permutation".
Improved super-pseudorandomness of MISTY type permutation
We say that a permutation g over {0,
, where a = 0, 1. Then this g is clearly XOR-distinct.
In this section, we prove that
) is super-pseudorandom even if the second round permutation g is fixed and publicly known. g has only to be XOR-distinct. This means that the five round MISTY type permutation is super-pseudorandom even if the second round permutation has no randomness nor secrecy.
Let H 0 n be an -XOR universal permutation family over {0, 1} n , and H 1 n be a uniform -XOR universal permutation family over {0, 1}
n . Define
Let D be a super-pseudorandom distinguisher for MISTY 01 2n which makes at most m queries in total. We consider two experiments, experiment 0 and experiment 1. In experiment 0, D has oracle access to ψ and ψ −1 , where ψ is randomly chosen from MISTY 01 2n . In experiment 1, D has oracle access to R and R −1 , where R is randomly chosen from P 2n .
Define the advantage of D as follows.
2n and y (i) ∈ {0, 1} 2n for 1 ≤ i ≤ m arbitrarily in such a way that {x (i) } 1≤i≤m are all distinct and {y (i) } 1≤i≤m are all distinct. Then the number of ψ ∈ MISTY 01 2n such that
is at least
A proof is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 3.1. For any super-pseudorandom distinguisher D that makes at most m queries in total, 
, where either D's query was (+, x (i) ) and the answer it got was y (i) or D's query was (−, y (i) ) and the answer it got was
). Without loss of generality, we assume that {x (i) } 1≤i≤m are all distinct, and {y (i) } 1≤i≤m are all distinct. Since D has unbounded computational power, D can be assumed to be deterministic. Therefore, the final output of D (0 or 1) depends only on v. Hence denote by C D (v) the final output of D.
For each v ∈ v one , the number of R such that
is exactly (2 2n − m)!. Therefore, we have
Evaluation of p ψ . From the definition of p ψ , we have
Similarly to p R , we have
Then from Lemma 3.1, we obtain that
This can be shown easily by an induction on m), we have
Applying the same argument to 1 − p ψ and 1 − p R yields that
Finally, (3) and (4) give
Super-pseudorandomness of MISTY
2n
Let D be a super-pseudorandom distinguisher for MISTY . In experiment 1, D has oracle access to R, R −1 , p and p −1 , where R is randomly chosen from P 2n and p is randomly chosen from P n .
Let m 0 and m 1 be integers. Fix x (i) ∈ {0, 1} 2n and y (i) ∈ {0, 1} 2n for 1 ≤ i ≤ m 0 arbitrarily in such a way that {x (i) } 1≤i≤m0 are all distinct and {y (i) } 1≤i≤m0 are all distinct. Similarly, fix X (i) ∈ {0, 1} n and Y (i) ∈ {0, 1} n for 1 ≤ i ≤ m 1 arbitrarily in such a way that {X (i) } 1≤i≤m1 are all distinct and
A proof is given in Appendix B. 
, where either D's query was (+, x (i) ) and the answer it got was y (i) or D's query was (−, y (i) ) and the answer it got was x (i) . Similarly for the i-th query D makes to p or p −1 , define the queryanswer pair (
n , where either D's query was (+, X (i) ) and the answer it got was Y (i) or D's query was (−, Y (i) ) and the answer it got was
Without loss of generality, we assume that {x (i) } 1≤i≤m0 are all distinct, {y (i) } 1≤i≤m0 are all distinct, {X (i) } 1≤i≤m1 are all distinct and {Y (i) } 1≤i≤m1 are all distinct. Then similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.1, denote by
For each (v, V ) ∈ (v, V ) one , the number of (R, p) such that
is exactly (2 2n − m 0 )!(2 n − m 1 )!. Therefore, we have
Then from Lemma 3.2, we obtain that
This can be shown easily by an induction on m 0 ), we have
Finally, (7) and (8) give
Negative result
Let g be a fixed and publicly known XOR-distinct permutation. In Theorem 3.2, we showed that ψ(h 1 , g, p, p
) is super-pseudorandom even if the distinguisher has oracle access to p and p −1 , where h 1 and h 5 are uniform -XOR universal permutations, and p is a random permutation.
One might think that ψ(h 1 , g, p, p, h
) is super-pseudorandom even if the distinguisher has oracle access to p and p −1 . In this section, however, we show that this is not true. We can distinguish ψ(h 1 , g, p, p, h More generally, let p 1 , p 2 , p, p 5 ∈ P n be random permutations and ψ = ψ(p 1 , p 2 , p, p, p 5 ). We prove that ψ is not pseudorandom if the distinguisher has oracle access to p 2 , p −1 2 and p. This proof implies that for any fixed and public g, ψ(p 1 , g, p, p, p 5 ) is not super-pseudorandom nor pseudorandom if the distinguisher has oracle access to p.
There exists a pseudorandom distinguisher D that has oracle access to p 2 , p −1 2 and p and makes 6 queries in total,
Proof. Let O = R or ψ. Our distinguisher D has oracle access to O, p 2 , p −1 2 and p. Consider the following D:
2 and obtain A.
Pick X, A ∈ {0, 1}
n such that A = A arbitrarily. 3. Ask (X, A) to O and obtain (Y, B). 4. Ask A ⊕ A to p 2 and obtain C. 5. Ask A ⊕ B to p and obtain D. 6. Ask A ⊕ B ⊕ C to p and obtain E. 7. Ask (X, A ⊕ A ) to O and obtain (Z, F ).
Output "1" if and only if
If O = ψ, then B is the input to p in both third round and fourth round at step 3 since p 2 (A) = (0, . . . , 0). Therefore we have p 1 (X) ⊕ A = B. Now the input to p in the third round at step 7 is p 1 (X) ⊕ A ⊕ A which is equivalent to A ⊕ B. Next the input to p in the fourth round at step 7 is A ⊕ B ⊕ C since p 2 (A ⊕ A ) = C. Then we always have F = A ⊕ B ⊕ C ⊕ D ⊕ E at step 8. Hence we have p ψ = 1.
If
Corollary 4.1. For any fixed and public g, ψ(p 1 , g, p, p, p 5 ) is not super-pseudorandom if the distinguisher has oracle access to p.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed more efficient constructions of super-pseudorandom permutations based on the five round MISTY type permutation than those given in [3] .
In particular, we showed that the second round permutation g need not be cryptographic at all, i.e., no randomness nor secrecy is required.
More precisely, let p and p i be random permutations, then we proved that
) is super-pseudorandom, where h 1 is an -XOR universal permutation, g is a (publicly known and fixed) XOR-distinct permutation, and h 5 is a uniform -XOR universal permutation (Theorem 3.1 4 . Number of h 1 . First, for any fixed i and j such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m:
L , then there exists no h 1 such that
L , then the number of h 1 which satisfies (9) is at most #H 0 n since h 1 is an -XOR universal permutation.
Therefore, the number of h 1 such that
is at most m 2 #H 0 n . Next, for any fixed i and j such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m:
R , and our XOR-distinct g guarantees g(x
L , then the number of h 1 which satisfies (11) is at most #H 0 n since h 1 is an -XOR universal permutation.
Then, from (10) and (12), the number of h 1 such that are fixed in such a way that:
for 1 ≤ ∀i < ∀j ≤ m, and
Number of h 5 . Similarly, the number of h 5 such that
is at least #H are fixed in such a way that: (which are corresponding outputs of p) are all distinct. In other words, for p, the above 2m input-output pairs are determined. The other 2 n − 2m input-output pairs are undetermined. Therefore we have (2 n − 2m)! possible choice of p for any such fixed h 1 and h 5 .
To summarize, we have:
choice of h 5 when h 1 is fixed, and -(2 n − 2m)! choice of p when h 1 and h 5 are fixed.
Then the number of ψ ∈ MISTY 01 2n which satisfy (1) is at least
This concludes the proof of the lemma. Number of h 5 . Similarly, the number of h 5 such that 
